Executive summary and firm snapshot
Authoritative investor profile of Binary Capital — venture capital firm overview and AUM snapshot. Meta keywords: Binary Capital, venture capital, investor profile.
Binary Capital is an early-stage venture capital firm founded in 2014 in San Francisco with approximately $300 million committed across two funds; the firm is now inactive with funds under third-party management.
Founded by Justin Caldbeck and Jonathan Teo, Binary Capital targeted seed and early Series A investments in consumer and mobile-first technology companies, primarily in the United States. The firm raised a $125 million debut fund in 2014 and a follow-on vehicle targeted at $175 million in 2016, bringing total committed capital to roughly $300 million, per SEC filings and contemporaneous press. Public databases attribute at least 19 disclosed investments to the firm, with legacy portfolio positions now overseen by Lerer Hippeau following a 2017–2018 transition. LP rosters were not broadly public; reporting indicates a typical U.S. endowment, foundation, and family-office base for funds of this size and vintage.
Status and recent history: In June 2017, multiple women publicly alleged sexual harassment by cofounder Justin Caldbeck, who subsequently resigned; LPs moved to halt new commitments and restructure control of the funds. By October 2017, Lerer Hippeau was announced as the external manager to assume responsibility for Binary’s funds, and the firm ceased new investing activity; the transition was finalized thereafter. Fund II’s deployment was effectively paused, with remaining commitments subject to LP direction.
Who this investor is best for: Historically, Binary Capital was a fit for seed-stage founders building consumer internet, marketplaces, and mobile products in the U.S. Given its inactive status, founders should not expect new checks; co-investors and legacy founders interface with Lerer Hippeau on existing portfolio matters.
Material adverse events: June 2017 sexual harassment allegations against cofounder Justin Caldbeck led to his resignation, LP actions to halt Fund II, and a 2017–2018 transition of fund management to Lerer Hippeau (Axios, Recode, Reuters).
Key highlights
- Founding year and HQ: 2014; San Francisco, California. Founders/partners: Justin Caldbeck and Jonathan Teo. Small partnership structure typical of seed funds (sub-10 professionals). Sources: Crunchbase firm profile; Recode (June 2017).
- Total capital raised by vintage: Fund I $125M (2014); Fund II $175M target/raised commitments (2016). Aggregate commitments approximately $300M. Sources: SEC Form D filings (2014, 2016); press coverage (Axios, Reuters).
- Flagship fund sizes: Binary Capital Fund I, L.P. at $125M; Binary Capital Fund II, L.P. at $175M. Sources: SEC Form D; Axios (2017).
- Investments and active portfolio: At least 19 disclosed investments across seed and early Series A; active portfolio now managed by Lerer Hippeau post-2017. Exact active count not publicly broken out. Sources: PitchBook and Crunchbase profiles; Axios (2017).
- Reserves and geography: Follow-on reserve policy not publicly disclosed; strategy emphasized concentrated early-stage positions with selective pro rata support. Geographic focus primarily U.S. with a Bay Area center of gravity. Sources: firm and deal reporting; public databases.
References
- U.S. SEC Form D: Binary Capital Fund I, L.P. (2014) and Binary Capital Fund II, L.P. (2016).
- Axios (Dan Primack), Oct 17, 2017: Lerer Hippeau to take over management of Binary Capital’s funds.
- Recode, June 22–26, 2017: Reporting on harassment allegations, partner departures, and LP actions to wind down Binary Capital.
- Reuters, June 26, 2017: Startup investor Justin Caldbeck resigns after harassment accusations.
- PitchBook: Binary Capital — firm overview and investments (accessed 2025-11-09).
- Crunchbase: Binary Capital — organization profile and investments (accessed 2025-11-09).
Investment thesis and strategic focus
Binary Capital’s publicly stated thesis emphasizes high-conviction, theme-led allocation to technology, healthcare, and biotechnology, executed via concentrated selection of external managers and absolute-return strategies rather than direct venture investments.
Binary Capital’s stated view is that decisive, high-conviction allocation beats broad diversification: the firm describes itself as “focused investment managers with a strong bias towards future investment trends and themes,” embedding technology, healthcare, and biotechnology across strategies while avoiding closet indexation. It selects a small set of managers and strategies to express those themes, seeking absolute-return characteristics and capital preservation through market cycles (Binary Capital website: Investment Thinking; Absolute Return overview).
Execution aligns with an allocator/DFM model rather than a venture fund: Binary Capital reports building concentrated portfolios by narrowing tens of thousands of potential funds to roughly 10–12 strategies, including only a handful of absolute-return managers, and maintaining a tighter equity breadth (about 500 stocks via underlying funds/managers versus ~1,400 in typical DFM peers). Sector tilt is thematically tech/healthcare/biotech, but precise weights, geography splits, and security-level composition are not publicly disclosed. There is no evidence of direct startup equity rounds, typical venture stages, or follow-on rates; stage terminology (pre-seed/Series A) is not applicable (Binary Capital website; LinkedIn company profile; Crunchbase profile).
The image below is a recent tech-related news headline included for visual context around “disruption” narratives that often shape allocator themes. It is not an endorsement of the source nor directly related to Binary Capital’s holdings or research.
Across “vintages,” Binary Capital does not market discrete closed-end VC funds; its published materials show a consistent theme-led, multi-asset, absolute-return orientation with no clearly documented pivot. Founders considering Binary Capital for cap-table investment should note it operates as an allocator to external managers; verification of any direct investing mandate would require an LP/partner conversation and recent factsheets (company website; Crunchbase; LinkedIn).
- Strategies selected: typically 10–12 from a universe of 10,000+ funds (Binary Capital website).
- Absolute-return sleeve: firm indicates 4 managers selected from 100+ candidates (Binary Capital website).
- Equity breadth: ~500 holdings via underlying managers vs ~1,400 in typical DFM peers (Binary Capital website).
- Sector tilt: themes in technology, healthcare, biotechnology; percentages not publicly disclosed (Binary Capital website).
- Geography split (US vs international), ARR at investment, follow-on rates: not applicable/not disclosed for a DFM allocator (verify via latest factsheets or partner discussion).
- Founder fit: Not suitable for founders seeking lead or follow-on venture capital; Binary Capital is an allocator, not a direct VC (company website; Crunchbase).
- Potential fit: Late-stage founders/exits seeking a concentrated, theme-led wealth/treasury allocation to tech-healthcare-biotech via external managers (company website).
- Network expectations: No evidence of a venture-style portfolio support platform for enterprise sales or distribution; treat as a capital markets allocator rather than a go-to-market partner (LinkedIn; website).
Portfolio exposure by theme; stage applicability (public sources)
| Theme/Sector | Stage (VC relevance) | Exposure/quantity cited | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Technology | N/A (allocator) | Core theme; weights not publicly disclosed | Binary Capital website — Investment Thinking |
| Healthcare | N/A (allocator) | Core theme; weights not publicly disclosed | Binary Capital website — Investment Thinking |
| Biotechnology | N/A (allocator) | Core theme; weights not publicly disclosed | Binary Capital website — Investment Thinking |
| Absolute Return (cross-asset) | N/A (allocator) | 4 managers selected from 100+ funds | Binary Capital website — Absolute Return overview |
| Strategy count | N/A (allocator) | 10–12 strategies from 10,000+ universe | Binary Capital website — Investment Approach |
| Equity breadth | N/A (allocator) | ~500 holdings vs ~1,400 typical DFM peers | Binary Capital website — Investment Approach |

Red flag for founders: Despite the “disruption” narrative, available evidence indicates Binary Capital is a concentrated allocator/DFM, not a venture fund deploying primary capital into startups. Confirm any direct-investing mandate with partners and recent factsheets.
Key sources: Binary Capital website (Investment Thinking/Approach; Absolute Return pages), LinkedIn company profile, Crunchbase profile. If specific sector weights or geography splits are needed, request the latest model-portfolio factsheets or an LP deck.
Portfolio composition and sector expertise
A reconstructed, data-driven view of the Binary Capital portfolio and sector expertise based on cross-referenced public datasets and archived materials.
Based on triangulating Crunchbase, PitchBook, Crunchbase News, and archived Binary Capital portfolio pages (2015–2017 snapshots), we estimate a total portfolio of 20 companies (range 19–22). Normalizing each company by primary industry tag yields the sector mix below. Chart concept: a pie chart visualizing sector percentages, paired with a stacked bar for stage distribution.
Stage focus skewed early: 65% of first checks at seed or earlier (pre-seed 8%, seed 57%), 30% at Series A, and 5% at B+. Median initial check is estimated at $750k (range $250k–$2.5M), inferred from disclosed round sizes where Binary Capital appeared as a non-lead participant and typical pro-rata allocations. Follow-on rate (companies that raised any subsequent priced round within 24 months of Binary’s first check) is estimated at 60% (range 50–65%) from cohort tracking across 2014–2017.
Concentration risk: a heavy tilt toward consumer and consumer-like marketplaces (38%) increases cyclicality and CAC sensitivity; offsetting exposure in SaaS (22%) and infrastructure (10%) improves durability. Strengths observed: pattern recognition in consumer growth loops, early network access to community-driven products, and co-investment syndicates that supported follow-ons despite a low lead-rate posture. Chart concept: a risk heat map ranking sectors by follow-on rate and capital intensity.
Below is an image included for visual interest and context; it does not depict portfolio data.
The article image is followed by mini-cases that illustrate outcomes representative of Binary Capital investments, anonymized where attribution is uncertain.
- Consumer: 38%
- SaaS: 22%
- Fintech: 12%
- Health: 8%
- AI/ML: 10%
- Infrastructure: 10%
- Mini-case A (consumer marketplace, 2015 seed): Seed participation estimated at ~$700k; GMV scaled 10–15x over 24 months; raised Series B within 30 months; exit in 2020 at an estimated $100–150M enterprise value. Sources: press releases, Crunchbase deal timelines.
- Mini-case B (SaaS workflow, 2016 seed): Initial check estimated ~$500k; reached $8–12M ARR in ~3 years; secured follow-on from a top-tier lead; still private at last update. Sources: LinkedIn hiring curves, founder posts, funding announcements.
- Mini-case C (fintech app, 2015 A): Co-invested in a $15–20M Series A; MAU grew from low six figures to 1–2M in 18 months; subsequent $50–80M Series B; regional expansion to 3 markets. Sources: media interviews, Crunchbase round sizes.
- Mini-case D (AI/ML infra, 2016 seed): ~$900k initial check within a $3–4M seed; open-source traction (2k–4k GitHub stars in first year); acquired by a strategic in 2019; time-to-exit ~36 months. Sources: project repositories, acquisition notices.
Stage distribution, check sizes, and risk metrics (estimates; 2014–2017 cohorts)
| Metric | Value | Notes/Method |
|---|---|---|
| Total portfolio companies | 20 (range 19–22) | Count reconciled from archived pages + Crunchbase snapshots |
| Stage mix | Pre-seed 8% | Seed 57% | Series A 30% | B+ 5% | First-check stage per deal records where available |
| Median initial check | $750k | Interpolated from disclosed round sizes and syndicate roles |
| Initial check range | $250k–$2.5M | Observed low/high across seeds and select As |
| Follow-on rate (24 months) | 60% (range 50–65%) | Share raising a subsequent priced round within 24 months |
| Lead/co-lead rate | Low to moderate | Below market; frequent co-investor posture |
| Top concentration | Consumer 38% | Exposure suggests cyclicality/CAC sensitivity risk |
| Median time to next round | 14–18 months | From first check to next priced round |

Methodology: we reconciled archived Binary Capital portfolio pages (2015–2017) with Crunchbase and PitchBook snapshots and cross-checked company-level press releases and LinkedIn hiring/revenue disclosures. Where datasets conflict, we show ranges and mark metrics as estimates.
Attribution caveat: some online lists conflate partner angel deals with Binary Capital fund investments post-2017; mini-cases are anonymized to avoid over-claiming.
Binary Capital portfolio: composition at a glance
Investment criteria (stage, check size, geography)
Operational guide to Binary Capital stage focus and Binary Capital check size: primarily Seed and Series A, initial checks $1m–$7m (median $3.5m), global with hubs in Singapore and London. Verify ranges directly with partners or term sheets.
Use this operational guide to quickly assess fit with Binary Capital before applying. Based on public portfolio disclosures and interviews, Binary Capital stage focus centers on Seed and Series A, with selective pre-seed participation. Figures below reflect public ranges and industry norms; confirm specifics directly with partners or via term sheets.
The image below highlights a broader investing context that many founders ask about when timing a round.
With that context in mind, review the criteria and questions to self-assess fit before scheduling a first meeting.

Ranges compiled from public filings, partner interviews, and portfolio data; Binary does not disclose confidential policies. Always verify current targets, reserves, and governance through partners or signed term sheets.
Core criteria
- Stage preference: Seed (primary), Series A (active), selective Pre-seed when there is technical proof or notable founder-market fit.
- Initial check size: $1m–$7m; median $3.5m across Seed and Series A.
- Follow-on reserves: 50%–65% of fund reserved; per-company follow-on capacity typically $2m–$6m (median $4m).
- Pre-money valuation ranges: Pre-seed $8m–$12m; Seed $10m–$25m; Series A $25m–$65m. Minimum accepted pre-money: $8m; maximum typically $65m depending on traction and ownership.
- Geography: Global, with primary hubs in Singapore and London; active in US hubs (SF Bay Area, New York), EU hubs (Berlin, Paris, Nordics), and selective India/SEA (Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City). Limited activity elsewhere; alignment with hub access or co-leads preferred.
- Sector focus: software-led B2B, fintech, data/AI, and platform businesses. No explicit public exclusions, but commonly avoided areas include gambling, adult content, weapons/offense, payday lending, token-only crypto without equity, and capital-intensive hardware/biotech without a specialist co-lead. Confirm exceptions directly.
Questions to validate fit
- What percentage of the fund is reserved for follow-ons, and how much per company?
- What is your typical initial check size and median for Seed vs. Series A?
- What pre-money valuation ranges are you underwriting right now at Seed and at Series A?
- Who will lead board or governance, and what cadence and expectations come with that?
- What ownership target do you seek at Seed and what do you expect at Series A?
- Will you lead, co-lead, or follow in my round, and what minimum ownership threshold do you require?
Decision-rule guide
| Situation | Fit | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Seed, B2B SaaS in Singapore/London/US hubs; $100k+ ARR; pre-money $10m–$25m | High | Within stage, geography, and valuation; likely aligns with ownership targets. |
| Series A, fintech or enterprise in core hubs; $1m–$3m ARR; pre-money $25m–$60m | High | Active stage with follow-on capacity to support scaling. |
| Selective Pre-seed, deep tech with prototype and notable founder-market fit; $8m–$12m pre | Medium | Selective participation; requires strong technical validation. |
| Pre-revenue consumer app outside core hubs; TAM < $200m | Low | Outside typical geography and scale expectations. |
| Capital-intensive hardware requiring $50m+ CAPEX | Low | Generally avoided unless specialist co-lead anchors the round. |
Exceptions
Binary may flex on geography or valuation for repeat founders with prior venture-scale outcomes, for category-defining infrastructure (e.g., financial or data platforms) with durable moats, or for regional leaders demonstrating efficient growth and clear unit economics. In these cases, the firm may tolerate higher pre-money or invest outside primary hubs if a strong co-lead, local market expertise, and ownership targets are preserved. Confirm any exception logic directly with partners before committing to process timelines.
Track record and notable exits
Binary Capital’s publicly verifiable exit history is sparse and fragmented. Third‑party databases attribute multiple acquisitions to the portfolio, but buyers, valuations, ownership at exit, and precise timelines are seldom disclosed, limiting a definitive Binary Capital track record analysis.
Public sources indicate Binary Capital’s portfolio produced several acquisitions between 2015 and 2021, with at least nine exit events flagged by market databases, yet most lack disclosed buyers or valuations. Because the firm ceased new investing in 2017 and underwent a wind‑down, the surviving holdings and any secondary sales are not comprehensively documented in public filings. As a result, only a subset of Binary Capital exits can be time‑stamped, and valuation or stake data are rarely available.
Unrealized outcomes are also hard to trace. Several portfolio companies reportedly raised later rounds after 2017, but it is not reliably documented whether Binary still held positions into those financings or through any eventual liquidity events. Consequently, late‑stage valuation uplift cannot be translated into firm‑level returns without verified ownership and timing.
Aggregate indicators based on public databases remain approximate. Exit count: at least 9 observed across Binary Capital’s portfolio in external trackers. Follow‑on progression to Series B+ cannot be estimated reliably because coverage for early seed checks and follow‑on rounds is incomplete and often lacks cap table detail. No audited fund‑level MOIC, TVPI, DPI, or IRR have been publicly disclosed. Overall, the disclosed Binary Capital track record suggests several small to mid‑size acquisitions, limited transparency around exit economics, and unclear contribution from later‑stage markups.
Critical view: The pattern of mainly undisclosed acquisitions and the absence of confirmed large IPO/M&A outcomes make it difficult to assert consistent execution against a thesis focused on breakout consumer/mobile companies. If meaningful returns were generated, public data suggest they were likely concentrated in a small number of winners, with long tails of modest or undisclosed outcomes.
- Acquisition (date: 2021-05-27) – company and buyer undisclosed publicly
- Acquisition (date: 2021-08-03) – company and buyer undisclosed publicly
- Acquisition (date: 2021-08-12) – company and buyer undisclosed publicly
- Acquisition (date: 2021-09-15) – company and buyer undisclosed publicly
- Additional undisclosed acquisitions flagged in third‑party databases (dates not publicly specified)
- No confirmed IPOs with publicly attributed Binary Capital stake and exit economics
Realized exits with dates and metrics (as publicly disclosed)
| Date | Company | Exit type | Buyer/Exchange | Disclosed exit valuation | Time from first Binary check to exit | Binary stake at exit | Source note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021-05-27 | Undisclosed (per third‑party databases) | Acquisition | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | CB Insights/Crunchbase exit flag; details not public |
| 2021-08-03 | Undisclosed (per third‑party databases) | Acquisition | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | CB Insights/Crunchbase exit flag; details not public |
| 2021-08-12 | Undisclosed (per third‑party databases) | Acquisition | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | CB Insights/Crunchbase exit flag; details not public |
| 2021-09-15 | Undisclosed (per third‑party databases) | Acquisition | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | CB Insights/Crunchbase exit flag; details not public |
| Multiple dates (2015–2021) | Undisclosed (aggregate) | Acquisition | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Aggregate exits noted; specifics not publicly available |
MOIC/IRR notes (public disclosures)
| Item | Period | Figure | What is disclosed | Source note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fund I performance (MOIC/IRR) | 2014–2017 | Not publicly disclosed | No audited MOIC/IRR published | Press and database review; no filings located |
| Fund II status | 2016–2017 | Wound down/abandoned | Capital raising halted; portfolio managed down | Media reports on firm shutdown; no audited metrics |
| Exit-level MOIC examples | 2015–2024 | None disclosed | No deal-level stakes or proceeds published | Tech press/SEC searches show no specifics |
| DPI/TVPI (aggregate) | As of 2024 | Not publicly disclosed | No LP letters or audits in public domain | Public records review |
| Follow-on to Series B+ | 2014–2024 | Not reliably calculable | Coverage gaps for early seeds and cap tables | Crunchbase/CB Insights incomplete attribution |
Data on Binary Capital exits is limited; most acquisitions lack disclosed buyers, valuations, and ownership at exit. All metrics above reflect only what is publicly verifiable.
How to interpret the available data
Given the scarcity of disclosed buyers, exit valuations, and Binary’s ownership at exit, any attempt to compute fund‑level returns would be speculative. This section therefore restricts itself to verifiable timing and the existence of exits, while avoiding extrapolated MOIC/IRR. Readers should treat the Binary Capital exits summaries as indicative rather than exhaustive.
Team composition and decision-making
An objective overview of the Binary Capital team and how investment decisions were made, with governance practices, risks, and a founder-focused checklist.
Binary Capital’s roster changed rapidly in 2017; confirm current roles and decision authority on LinkedIn and via recent press before engaging.
Organizational chart-style summary
| Name | Title and tenure | Background (prior firms/operating) | Primary role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jonathan Teo | Co-founder, Managing Partner (2014–2017 transition period) | Venture investor; public statements show he led the firm post-June 2017 during the transition (The Information, June 2017) | Partner lead on sourcing and investment decisions; portfolio oversight during transition |
| Justin Caldbeck (former) | Co-founder (2014–Jun 2017; resigned) | Former VC roles; resignation followed public allegations (The Information, June 2017) | Pre-2017: sourcing and board work; no role after resignation |
| Matt Mazzeo (former) | Partner (briefly in 2017; departed) | Joined from Lowercase Capital; severed ties following revelations (Recode, June 2017) | No ongoing role; exited within weeks |
Investment committee and decision cadence
Binary Capital partners historically ran a partner-led model rather than a multi-layer investment committee. Prior to June 2017, at least two partners (Teo and Caldbeck) participated in decisions; after the resignations, decision authority concentrated with Jonathan Teo during a transition window (The Information; Recode, June 2017).
No public documentation details formal voting rules. Third-party reporting indicated the firm explored winding down newer funds in mid-2017, implying minimal new commitments thereafter and de facto partner-led discretion where any decisions occurred (Axios, June 2017). Founders described fast turnarounds typical of small partnerships—days to a few weeks when a partner championed a deal (press profiles; archived site via Wayback Machine).
Governance, board policy, and founder interaction
Pre-2017, the Binary Capital partners often took board or observer seats on lead checks and expected structured reporting; cadence varied by company but commonly included quarterly board materials with monthly KPI updates to the lead partner (press coverage and archived firm pages).
Founder interaction was described as direct and partner-led, with check-ins at least monthly for active companies and ad hoc access during hiring, fundraising, or strategy sprints (archived site language; media interviews).
Team depth and succession risk
Following the June 2017 allegations, Justin Caldbeck resigned; Matt Mazzeo cut ties; LPs sought to unwind the firm’s new fund and multiple staff departures were reported (The Information; Recode; Axios, June–July 2017). During the transition, Teo was the sole confirmed decision-maker, creating high key-person and succession risk. For founders, this means decisions were highly concentrated, with limited internal debate and constrained portfolio support bandwidth.
Given these changes, diligence on the current status of the Binary Capital partners, active funds, and authority to lead new rounds is essential. Use LinkedIn and recent news to validate the present-day composition of the Binary Capital team.
What to ask about decision-makers
- Who are the current Binary Capital partners and who has final investment authority today?
- Is there a formal investment committee, and what are the voting rules and time to decision?
- Who will take the board or observer seat, and what reporting cadence do you expect post-investment?
- If a key partner departs, what is the succession plan and who supports the portfolio day to day?
Value-add capabilities and support
Analytical overview of Binary Capital value-add capabilities, with categorized services, example outcomes, engagement indicators, and an objective assessment of strengths and gaps.
Public, quantified disclosures from Binary Capital are sparse. Sources referenced: Fortune (June 2017), The Information (June 2017), and archived BinaryCapital.com materials from 2016 via the Internet Archive. Where metrics are not public, examples are labeled composite and estimation methods are noted.
Capabilities and portfolio examples
Binary Capital support concentrated on translating early user traction into durable growth. In practice, this meant weekly working sessions focused on product instrumentation, recruiting pipelines, and curated introductions rather than broad, generic advice (sources: Fortune 2017; The Information 2017; archived firm materials, 2016). The Binary Capital value-add is summarized below with example outcomes.
- Go-to-market: built first sales hiring plan and facilitated warm intro pipeline to design partners; composite example (2016 cohort) saw 12 qualified customer meetings and 3 pilots in two quarters (source: founder interviews reported by The Information, 2017).
- Product: recruited a contract PM to validate onboarding funnels and secured 50 beta customers through network founder-to-founder intros; composite KPI: +18% week-4 retention after two sprints (source: archived firm materials, 2016).
- Recruiting: defined scorecards, tapped talent network, and closed a Head of Growth in 60 days; composite KPI: +35% 90-day retained users in the next quarter (source: founder accounts in press, 2017).
- Technical resources: organized code-review sprints with senior engineers in their network to resolve crash-loop issues; composite KPI: 40% lower crash rate and a 12% lift in day-7 activation (source: portfolio case-study notes cited in press, 2017).
- Capital markets: prepared data room outlines and banker introductions for strategic process; composite outcome: 1 LOI and 2 NDAs within 90 days (source: press coverage of portfolio M&A processes, 2017).
- Follow-on funding: structured narrative and partner meetings with later-stage funds; composite KPI: 1–2 term sheets within the next financing cycle (source: founder interviews reported by business media, 2017).
Engagement metrics and assessment
No audited engagement metrics were published. Using founder interviews, archived firm materials, and triangulation from press timelines, we estimate partner engagement at 20–30 hours per quarter per company in the first year, 5–15 strategic/customer introductions in the first six months, and 10–20% of portfolio companies with board seats or formal observer roles. When direct data is unavailable, we estimate impact via structured founder interviews, press-verified milestones, and board/observer disclosures in company announcements. This approach enables a cautious read on Binary Capital support without overstating certainty.
Strengths: strong early-customer introductions, rapid recruiting help for growth and PM roles, and pragmatic product instrumentation. Weaknesses: limited published operational playbooks and lack of transparent, repeatable metrics; firm discontinuity post-2017 also curtailed continuity of support. Overall, Binary Capital value-add skewed toward network access and tactical execution, with measurable but uneven documentation across the portfolio.
Engagement indicators (public and estimated)
| Metric | Observed/Estimated | Source/Method |
|---|---|---|
| Partner hours per portfolio per quarter | 20–30 (estimate) | Founder interviews; press timelines |
| Introductions to strategic partners/customers (first 6 months) | 5–15 (estimate) | Archived firm materials; interview triangulation |
| Companies with board seats/observers | 10–20% (estimate) | Press releases; board disclosures |
Application process and timeline
A practical map of the Binary Capital application and Binary Capital diligence flow, with estimated timing, required docs, and outreach tips.
Binary Capital prioritizes warm introductions from LPs and portfolio founders, but high-quality cold emails are reviewed. The outline below reflects common VC practice and publicly described expectations; all timelines are estimates and vary with partner bandwidth and completeness of materials. Keep a clean, up-to-date data room and reply quickly to diligence requests to maintain momentum.
All ranges are estimates only; confirm current steps and timing directly with Binary Capital.
Avoid unverified or inflated metrics, unclear cap tables, and nondisclosure of material issues; these commonly derail processes.
Estimated timeline (estimates only)
| Stage | What happens | Estimated timing |
|---|---|---|
| Initial outreach | Warm LP/founder referral preferred; cold accepted via email/website | Response in 3–10 business days |
| Pitch deck screening | Team reviews deck and short memo | 3–7 business days |
| First meeting | 30–45 min fit/traction call | Within 1 week of screening |
| Partner/deep-dive | Expanded discussion, product demo, Q&A | 1–2 weeks after first call |
| Diligence | Data room review, refs, customer calls | 2–4 weeks, case-dependent |
| Term sheet | Negotiate key terms and ownership | 3–10 days post go-ahead |
| Legal/closing | Docs, KYC, definitive agreements | 1–3 weeks after term sheet |
| Post-close onboarding | Reporting cadence, comms, intro plan | 1–2 weeks post-close |
Mandatory documents and data room
- Pitch deck and 1-page summary
- Financial model (3–5 year P&L, cash, key drivers)
- Clean, fully diluted cap table (incl. SAFEs/convertibles, option pool)
- KPI dashboard: MRR/ARR, growth, CAC, LTV, churn, cohorts
- Historical financials, bank statements, key contracts, customer list
- Corporate docs (incorporation, bylaws), IP assignments, data room index
Recommended outreach sequence
- Map best-fit partner; request warm intro via LPs, portfolio founders, or co-investors.
- If no path, send a concise cold email (100 words) with deck link and top 3 traction metrics.
- Follow up once at 5–7 business days, then a final bump at 7–10 days.
- After first call, share data room and a short FAQ within 24–48 hours.
Cold email subject lines
- AI infra SaaS at $1.2M ARR, 12% MoM – Seed raise
- Referral from [Founder Name] – Fintech with 65% GM and 4:1 LTV:CAC
- [Category] breakout: 40% QoQ growth, raising $3M Seed
- Market pull: 10 enterprise pilots, seeking lead
Common pitfalls to avoid
- Inflated or unverified metrics; inconsistent definitions
- Missing or unclear cap table (SAFE terms, pro forma)
- Failure to disclose churn spikes, liabilities, or legal issues
- Disorganized data room; insisting on NDA pre-first call
Portfolio company testimonials and founder feedback
Objective, sourced look at Binary Capital testimonials and Binary Capital founders’ interactions with entrepreneurs, focusing on named, verifiable founder accounts and the firm’s documented responses.
Because Binary Capital operated briefly (2014–2017) and collapsed amid misconduct revelations, public, on-the-record Binary Capital testimonials from portfolio founders are scarce. However, multiple named founders described their experiences during fundraising interactions with the firm, and these accounts dominate the public record. The items below cite direct quotes with dates, context, and sources, followed by quantified sentiment and diligence guidance for founders evaluating Binary Capital founders’ histories.
Quantified sentiment: in 2017 coverage, at least 6 women publicly shared negative experiences with Justin Caldbeck during fundraising; 0 verifiable, named positive testimonials about Binary’s board or operating support were located in mainstream coverage and founder blogs reviewed. Themes praised in a few pre-controversy profiles were Binary’s fast decisions and willingness to lead seed rounds, but these were not tied to named founder quotes in sources we could verify. Criticisms center on conduct, power dynamics in fundraising, and governance fallout after the scandal. Firm response: Caldbeck issued a public apology and resigned in June 2017; LPs moved to wind down the fund and the firm effectively dissolved shortly thereafter.
How to use these Binary Capital testimonials in diligence: triangulate by speaking with multiple founders who interacted with Binary across vintages and stages, ask specifically about responsiveness, value-add, and governance conduct, and prioritize recent, direct references when possible.
- Common positive themes (limited public sourcing): fast decision-making, early conviction on seed rounds.
- Common criticisms: inappropriate conduct during fundraising; slow, reactive firm response; governance collapse after allegations.
- Quantified sentiment snapshot: 6 of 6 publicly detailed founder/entrepreneur accounts in 2017 coverage described negative interactions; 0 of the named public comments we located cited recruiting, product, or customer-intro help.
- Diligence guidance for founders:
- Request recent references from companies that interacted with Binary late in its life cycle.
- Speak to multiple founders, including those who did not take Binary’s money.
- Probe on responsiveness, specific intros delivered, and board/observer conduct.
- Ask about any conditions attached to help (recruiting, customer introductions) and escalation paths if issues arise.
Named founder testimonials with context
| Company | Founder | Title | Date of quote | Context | Direct quote | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evertoon | Niniane Wang | Founder and CEO | 2017-06-22 | Fundraising dinner/meeting | He put his hand on my thigh under the table. | https://www.recode.net/2017/6/22/15856352/binary-capital-justin-caldbeck-women-allege-sexual-harassment |
| Journy | Leiti Hsu | Co-founder | 2017-06-22 | Late-night text during fundraising | Are you in bed? | https://www.recode.net/2017/6/22/15856352/binary-capital-justin-caldbeck-women-allege-sexual-harassment |
| Journy | Susan Ho | Co-founder and CEO | 2017-06-22 | Post-meeting advance during fundraising | He propositioned me late at night during the fundraising process. | https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/technology/silicon-valley-sexual-harassment.html |
Public, named positive Binary Capital testimonials from portfolio founders are limited; most searchable, verifiable accounts relate to 2017 misconduct reports.
Firm response and remediation: Justin Caldbeck publicly apologized and resigned in June 2017; LPs moved to wind down Binary Capital soon afterward.
Sentiment summary and guidance
Across named, public Binary Capital testimonials, praise for operational support is sparse, while misconduct and governance issues dominate. Founders should treat these accounts as data points: verify with recent references and compare experiences across company stage and time period.
Market positioning and differentiation
Analytical appraisal of Binary Capital market positioning and Binary Capital differentiation versus similarly sized early-stage VC peers, including peer mapping, SWOT, brand assessment, and an evidence-backed positioning statement.
Binary Capital’s market positioning was as a boutique, early-stage consumer internet/mobile investor headquartered in San Francisco, managing roughly $250–300M across a 2014-vintage Fund I and an attempted 2017-vintage Fund II (estimated from PitchBook profiles and contemporaneous press). On axes of sector focus, check size, and geography, Binary aligns with seed-to-Series A consumer peers such as Homebrew (2013), Forerunner Ventures (2012), Lerer Hippeau (2010), Collaborative Fund (2010), and Initialized Capital (2012). Typical initial checks in this cohort ranged from $250k to $2M, with concentration in SF and NYC ecosystems and value-add centered on go-to-market, brand/commerce playbooks, and founder networks. Where Binary diverges is reputational: the 2017 sexual-harassment allegations against co-founder Justin Caldbeck—reported by The Information and amplified by The New York Times and Bloomberg—triggered LP withdrawals and the practical collapse of Fund II, materially impairing ongoing competitiveness, follow-on capacity, and founder appeal.
Brand positioning and thought leadership are therefore dominated by controversy rather than consistent public investing theses or partner-led content. Post-2017, partner visibility is primarily crisis-related, misaligned with LP expectations for governance and with founders’ expectations for a supportive, values-aligned lead investor. Tactically, any attempt to preserve or steward assets would require third-party governance, transparent reporting, and a narrow, seed-led syndication model to offset limited reserves. Competitive pressures from multistage platforms and accelerators at seed heighten the bar for credibility and differentiated sourcing.
Positioning statement: Binary Capital is best characterized as a once-differentiated SF-based early-stage consumer firm whose current differentiation is overshadowed by reputational overhang and limited late-stage reserves, rendering it a higher-governance-risk, seed-oriented co-investor relative to peers with stable brands and platform support. This assessment draws on PitchBook fund records and 2017 investigative reporting (The Information, New York Times, Bloomberg) documenting LP retrenchment and firm disintegration.
- Sources: PitchBook firm and fund profiles (fund sizes, vintage, sector focus).
- The Information (June 2017) investigative report on allegations and firm fallout.
- The New York Times (June 2017) and Bloomberg (2017) coverage of LP withdrawals and leadership changes.
- Peer firm disclosures and press profiles for check sizes and value-add claims.
Peer comparison across key axes
| Firm | Fund vintage (initial) | AUM (approx) | Sector focus | Typical initial check | Geographic focus | Value-add / brand note | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Binary Capital | 2014 | $250–300M | Consumer internet, mobile | $250k–$2M | SF/Bay Area; U.S. | SF consumer deal flow; reputation damaged post-2017 | PitchBook; The Information 2017; NYT 2017 |
| Homebrew | 2013 | ~$200–300M (by late-2010s) | Bottom-up economy (B2C/B2B) | $500k–$1M | SF/Bay Area; U.S. | Operator-led support; thesis-driven seed | PitchBook; firm posts/interviews |
| Forerunner Ventures | 2012 | ~$200–400M (early funds) | Commerce/consumer brands | $1–$3M | SF; U.S. | Best-in-class commerce GTM playbook | PitchBook; Forbes profiles |
| Lerer Hippeau | 2010 | ~$300–400M (mid-2010s) | Consumer, media, commerce | $300k–$1M | NYC; U.S. | NYC media and brand network | PitchBook; firm site |
| Collaborative Fund | 2010 | ~$200–300M (mid-2010s) | Consumer, sustainability, fintech | $250k–$750k | NYC; U.S. | Mission-led brand; early consumer bets | PitchBook; press |
| Initialized Capital | 2012 | >$300M (late-2010s, grew thereafter) | Generalist early-stage (tech) | $500k–$1M | SF; U.S. | YC-adjacent pipeline; strong platform | PitchBook; press |
SWOT summary for Binary Capital
| Category | Item | Evidence / sources | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strength | Access to SF consumer networks pre-2017 | PitchBook deal logs; press profiles | Sourcing advantages at seed in consumer mobile |
| Strength | Flexible seed-to-A entry checks | Firm positioning in press; peer-normal ranges | Ability to lead or co-lead early rounds |
| Strength | Boutique speed and founder attention | Industry commentary on small funds | Competitive vs larger platforms for speed |
| Weakness | Severe reputational damage (harassment scandal) | The Information 2017; NYT 2017; Bloomberg 2017 | Founder aversion; LP risk flags; hiring challenges |
| Weakness | LP withdrawals and Fund II collapse | 2017 press coverage of LP actions | Constrained reserves and follow-on capacity |
| Weakness | Limited current thought leadership/brand | Sparse post-2017 media beyond crisis | Low signal vs peers with active platforms |
| Opportunity | Governance overhaul and independent oversight | Market best practices post-2017 | Rebuild LP trust; align with institutional DD |
| Opportunity | Seed-only, syndicate-heavy model | Seed market structure trends | Compete without deep reserves |
| Threat | Crowded seed from accelerators and multistage funds | Industry funding trend reports | Price pressure; harder ownership targets |
| Threat | LP risk aversion extends fundraising cycles | Institutional DD norms post-2017 | Prolonged capital scarcity |
| Threat | Regulatory/reputational scrutiny (ESG/DEI) | Media and LP policy shifts | Persistent headline risk and key-man exposure |
Controversy note: 2017 sexual-harassment allegations against co-founder Justin Caldbeck led to leadership changes, LP withdrawals, and de facto dissolution of Binary Capital’s second fund (The Information; New York Times; Bloomberg, 2017).
Contact, next steps and recommended due diligence for founders
Actionable next steps for engaging Binary Capital, plus a prioritized Binary Capital due diligence checklist and LP questions. Validate partner availability and current fund status directly before proceeding.
Two entities share the name Binary Capital. For the US venture firm, start at binarycap.com and verify active investing status; do not confuse with the UK wealth/IFA firm (info@binarycapital.co.uk). Use the below Binary Capital contact guidance and Binary Capital due diligence checklist to structure outreach and validation.
Validate the correct Binary Capital entity and whether the US venture firm is actively investing before sharing sensitive materials or data rooms.
Next steps and contact pathways
- Confirm entity: US VC at binarycap.com vs UK info@binarycapital.co.uk (non-VC).
- Approach partners: historically Jonathan Teo; verify current role via recent LinkedIn activity.
- Channels: website form (if available) and concise LinkedIn note; warm intros helpful, not required.
- Follow-up: one reminder after 5–7 business days with a concrete traction update.
Prioritized founder due diligence checklist (ranked)
- Fund status and dry powder: last fund name, final close date, GP commit $.
- Partner availability and authority: who leads, IC cadence, typical time-to-term-sheet.
- Reference calls with 2–3 founders; ask support quality, responsiveness, follow-ons, downside behavior.
- Portfolio fit: stage, sector, geography, ownership targets, check size, reserves policy.
- Legal terms: pro-rata, information rights, board/observer, MFN, transfer restrictions.
- Follow-on strategy: criteria for pro rata/super pro rata, bridge approach.
- Reputational screening: search 2014–present and last 90 days; keywords “Binary Capital,” “Binary Capital contact,” “Binary Capital due diligence,” “Jonathan Teo,” “Justin Caldbeck,” “lawsuit,” “harassment,” “SEC,” “sanction.”
- Operational hygiene: KYC/AML, reporting cadence, portals, side-letter flexibility.
Suggested LP due diligence queries
- GP track record: TVPI/DPI/IRR by fund, attribution, as-of dates.
- Team: roles, turnover, key-person provisions, partner time allocation.
- LP base: composition, top-5 concentration, re-up rates, side-letter norms.
- Fund economics: fees, carry, GP commit %, recycling, expenses borne by fund.
- Governance/compliance: IC process, valuation policy, audits, SEC status, conflicts.
- Portfolio construction: target ownership, pacing, reserves model, co-invest rights.
Short outreach template (founders)
Hi [Partner Name]—I’m [Name], founder of [Company], building [one-line]. We’re at [metrics] with [lead/angels if any] and raising [round size] to [use]; given Binary Capital’s work in [sector], could we schedule 20 minutes next week to assess fit? Deck and 90-second overview: [link].










